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Abstract 
Although conspiracy theories have arguably always been an important feature of social 
life, they have only attracted the attention of social psychologists in recent years.  The last 
decade, however, has seen an increase in social psychological research on this topic that has 
yielded many insights into the causes and consequences of conspiracy thinking.  In this article, 
we draw on examples from our own programme of research to highlight how the methods and 
concepts of social psychology can be brought to bear on the study of conspiracy theories.  
Specifically, we highlight how basic social cognitive processes such as pattern perception, 
projection, and agency detection predict the extent to which people believe in conspiracy 
theories.  We then highlight the role of motivations such as the need for uniqueness, and the 
motivation to justify the system, in predicting the extent to which people adopt conspiracy 
explanations.  We next discuss how conspiracy theories have important consequences for social 
life, such as decreasing engagement with politics and influencing peopleÕs health and 
environmental decisions.  Finally, we reflect on some of the limitations of research in this domain 
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Why conspiracy theories matter: A social psychological analysis 
Conspiracy theories are attempts to explain the ultimate causes of significant social and 
political events as secret plots by powerful and malicious groups (e.g., Douglas, Sutton & 
Cichocka, 2017).  For example, well known contemporary conspiracy theories suppose that the 
9/11 attacks on the New York Twin Towers were an Ôinside jobÕ to help the Bush administration 
justify the war on terror, and that climate change is a hoax coordinated by scientists to secure 
research funding.  Conspiracy theories feature prominently in current political contexts, but they 
are not just a modern phenomenon (McKenzie-McHarg & Fredheim, 2017).  For example, 
conspiracy theories concerning the supposedly evil and controlling acts of Jewish people date 
back to antiquity, and there is good evidence that conspiracy theories were rife on the streets of 
ancient Rome (Knight, 2003; Uscinski & Parent, 2014). 
Conspiracy theories have arguably always been a feature of civilised social life.  It is also 
important to remember that people do conspire and a small number of conspiracy theories such as 
those surrounding the Watergate scandal have been found to be true.  However, conspiracy 
theories have attracted serious scholarly attention only since the middle of the 20th centuryÑand 
social psychologists arrived at the party decades later.  The philosopher Karl Popper was perhaps 
the first academic to pay conspiracy theories serious attention.  Popper (1945/2013) wrote against 
the Òconspiracy theory of historyÓ, which he defined as the view that historical, economic, and 
social phenomena are created not by random or systemic factors but are the planned outcomes of 
deliberate actions by powerful actors (for a review and critique of PopperÕs analysis, see Pigden, 
1995).  Popper saw this view as not only fallacious, because history is replete with unintended 
rather than intended consequences, but also pernicious, because it misdirects policies and 
scapegoats groups as culpable for societyÕs ills.  Popper saw this theory operating in the Nazi 
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regimeÕs blaming of Jews for the problems of Germany and the world, and also in their hubristic 
ambition to establish a utopian society that would last a thousand years.  In effect, the Nazis 
wanted to replace one perceived conspiracy with their own.  
In PopperÕs wake, scholarly interest in conspiracy theories gained momentum in the 
humanities and social sciences.  Hofstadter (1964), an historian, argued that conspiracy thinking 
was characteristic of American politics, forged, as they were, in the crucible of revolution and 
wars of secession.  In a landmark paper, the sociologist Goertzel (1994) explored how conspiracy 
theories may appeal in particular to ethnic minority groups and put forward the influential idea 
that belief in conspiracy theories can develop into a distinct and self-sustaining mindset.  The 
political science scholar Barkun (2003) put forward a theory of the social trends underpinning 
contemporary conspiracy belief, including the increasing appeal of millenarian (end of the world) 
thinking and stigmatised forms of ÒknowledgeÓ spanning beliefs about UFOs, alternative 
medicine, Atlantis, and astrology.  The American studies scholar Knight (2003) links conspiracy 
theories in the USA to a general cultural zeitgeist of paranoia.  Researchers across the social 
sciences have reported, among many other findings, that conspiracy theories are recruited to 
mobilise support by groups on either side of social divides including White supremacist and 
Black power groups (e.g., Corte & Edwards, 2008; Gosa, 2011).  In the humanities, researchers 
have charted vibrant and evolving traditions of conspiracy theory in cinema, literature and 
various forms of popular music (e.g., Arnold, 2008).  In medical and environmental sciences, 
researchers have written that conspiracy theories comprise a potent obstacle to the adoption of 
evidence-based decision-making by the public (e.g., Bogart & Bird, 2003).  Recently, digital 
communication scholars have shown that conspiracy theories proliferate widely on the web and 
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feature heavily in fake-news and post-fact discourses that are alleged to have undermined 
democracy and the public understanding of science (e.g., Del Vicario et al., 2016). 
As these examples make clear, conspiracy theories have captured the attention of scholars 
across many disciplines.  They also highlight the relevance of conspiracy theories to phenomena 
of long-standing interest to social psychologists, including intergroup relations, collective action, 
prejudice and discrimination, trust, ideology, epistemic motivations, and social cognition.  
Conspiracy theories, therefore, have much to offer social psychologyÑnot only opportunities for 
engagement with other academic disciplines but also advancements in its mission to understand 
the interplay between the social and the psychological.  In turn, social psychology has much to 
offer the interdisciplinary study of conspiracy theories.  It offers the methods needed to develop 
precise measurements of conspiracy beliefs and to tease them apart from related constructs, such 
as paranoid thinking (Imhoff & Lamberty, in press).  The use of experiments affords social 
psychology researchers the power to tease causal relationships apart from mere correlations.  As a 
discipline with an accumulated body of theory to relate social and psychological phenomena, it 
has powerful conceptual tools to bring to the study of conspiracy theories.  It is better placed than 
any other discipline to understand how social, historical, economic and cultural forces shapeÑ
and are shaped byÑpeopleÕs cognitive, emotional and behavioural responses to conspiracy 
theories.  
It is perhaps puzzling, then, that until the last decade, social psychologists paid little 
attention to conspiracy theories (for exceptions see Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax & Blaine, 1999; 
McHoskey, 1995).  Furthermore, aside from Moscovici (1987) who argued that belief in 
conspiracy theories constitutes a ÒmentalityÓ based on individualsÕ and groupsÕ fears and 
antipathy against minorities and outgroups, there has been very little theorising about the social 
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psychological functions of conspiracy theories.  This last decade, however, has seen a rapid 
increase in social psychological research that has already yielded many insights into the causes 
and consequences of conspiracy thinking.  Drawing on examples from our own programme of 
research, we highlight in this article how the methods and concepts of social psychology can be 
brought to bear on the study of conspiracy theories.  We outline some of the insights into the 
causes and consequences of conspiracy theories that social psychological research has yielded.  
Specifically, we underline how basic social cognitive processes such as pattern perception, 
projection, and agency detection predict the extent to which people believe in conspiracy 
theories.  This research suggests that we are all, to some extent, Ôconspiracy theoristsÕ.  We then 
highlight the role of motivations such as the need for uniqueness, and the motivation to justify the 
system, in predicting the extent to which people adopt conspiracy explanations.  That is, 
conspiracy beliefs are driven by central social motives.  We next discuss some of the important 
social consequences of believing in conspiracy theories, such as decreasing engagement with 
politics and influencing peopleÕs health and environmental decisions.  This research highlights 
that conspiracy theories are an important and impactful social phenomenon.  Finally, we then 
reflect on some of the limitations of the existing research and of our own research programme, 
and consider avenues for future research on this rapidly expanding topic. 
Social cognition 
 Much of the early research on the psychology of conspiracy theories focused on 
personality and individual differences factors that predispose people to believe in conspiracy 
theories.  Believers tended to be portrayed as delusional, irrational and paranoid.  For example, 
belief in conspiracy theories has been linked to factors such as non-clinical delusional thinking 
(Dagnall, Drinkwater, Parker, Denovan & Parton, 2015) and schizotypy (Barron, Morgan, 
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Towell, Altemeyer & Swami, 2014; Darwin, Neave & Holmes, 2011; Bruder, Haffke, Neave, 
Nouripanah & Imhoff, 2013; van der Tempel & Alcock, 2015; Swami, Pietschnig, Tran, Nader, 
Stiener & Voracek, 2013).  Furthermore, believers have been characterised as mistrustful 
(Goertzel, 1994), powerless, (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999), uncertain (van Prooijen & Jostmann, 
2013), and anxious (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013; Radnitz & Underwood, 2017).  
 However, recent findings call into question this rather pathological view of conspiracy 
beliefs.  Far from being limited to people who are paranoid and delusional, research suggests that 
conspiracy beliefs are common (Oliver & Wood, 2014) and may be better characterised as the 
product of everyday cognitive processes.  That is, everyone is to some extent likely to believe in 
conspiracy theories.  In this section, we highlight our research which shows that conspiracy 
beliefs are linked to the perception of agency and intentionality when it does not (or is unlikely 
to) exist, and to pattern perception more generally.  We also explore our findings demonstrating 
how people may use conspiracy theories to reconcile inconsistent beliefs, and how the process of 
projection can help explain why people believe in conspiracy theories.  
Agency detection 
Conspiracy theories portray socially significant events as the intended outcomes of 
schemes by malign groups.  Following Popper (1945/2013), Klein (2013) argued that people 
might have a conspiratorial view of historical events in generalÑoverestimating the role of 
conscious intentions in making these events happen.  More explicitly, other scholars have 
suggested that conspiracy theories arise from a tendency to anthropomorphise social forces (e.g., 
in political science see Qualter, 1985, in philosophy see Keeley, 2007, in cultural studies see 
Lewis & Kahn, 2005).  Research in social psychology has shown that lay people are indeed prone 
to anthropomorphic thinking, seeing weather events, machinesÕ behaviour, and even the 
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movements of basic two-dimensional geometric shapes as intentional and agentic (e.g., Heider & 
Simmel, 1944; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000).  Barrett (2004) argued that this happens because the 
brain is hard-wired to be hypersensitive to agency in the environment.  According to this 
perspective, it is necessary for people to be sensitive in case they face danger or threat, so this 
tendency is somewhat evolutionarily driven.   
In two studies, we built on this work to provide empirical tests of the role of 
anthropomorphic thinking in conspiracy belief (Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Harvey & Dawtry, 
2016; see also Brotherton & French, 2015; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014).  In our first correlational 
study, we asked 202 participants from the USA recruited from AmazonÕs Mechanical Turk 
(Mturk) to rate the extent to which they agreed with a list of well-known conspiracy theories 
(taken from Douglas & Sutton, 2011 Ð e.g., ÒThe Apollo moon landings were a hoaxÓ).  We then 
asked participants to view the animation by Heider and Simmel (1944), which depicted three 
shapes moving in and out of a rectangular box.  In the original study, Heider and Simmel found 
that the majority of participants described the movement of the shapes as they would describe the 
intentional actions of people (e.g., chasing, running away).  We asked participants several 
questions about the nature of the shapes (e.g., whether they were purposeful and conscious), and 
the actions of the shapes (e.g., whether they were intentional and the result of conscious 
decisions).  We combined responses to these questions to form our first measure of agency 
detection.  As a second measure of agency detection, we asked participants to complete an 
anthropomorphism scale (Waytz et al., 2010), which measures the extent to which people afford 
inanimate objects with human qualities.  Finally, we measured a range of demographic factors, 
including education level.  
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Our findings revealed that both measures of agency detection predicted belief in 
conspiracy theories (see Table 1).  Further, across Study 1 and a second study there was a 
significant relationship between education level and conspiracy belief, such that participants with 
lower levels of education were more likely to believe conspiracy theories.  In both studies, 
agency detection in the form of anthropomorphism mediated this relationship.  These findings 
therefore suggest that conspiracy theorising may partly be a consequence of a specific thinking 
styleÑassuming that events have an underlying intentional cause when they most likely do notÑ
and that this thinking style may be somewhat changed by education.  Importantly, rather than 
being the result of delusional or paranoid thinking, belief in conspiracy theories may simply 
result from the overestimation of agency and intentionality in the environment.  Underscoring 
this point, in our second study (N = 330 Mturk participants from the USA) we controlled for 
belief in paranormal phenomena (a specific type of irrational belief), and found our results held.  
TABLE 1 HERE 
Pattern perception 
Just as scholars across disciplines have suggested that anthropomorphic thinking fuels 
conspiracy theories, scholars in political science (Barkun, 2003), sociology (Spark, 2000), and 
literary studies (Wilman, 1998) have argued that conspiracy theories are a response to the 
apparent randomness of socio-political events.  Social psychologists have shown that people are 
averse to this randomness, and impose meaning on it cognitively by perceiving patterns in events, 
including causal connections, even when none exist (Zhao, Hahn, & Osherson, 2014).  Whitson 
and Galisnky (2008) linked this tendency to conspiracy theories by showing that both the 
perception of patterns (e.g., planets, buildings, or animals) in random visual arrays, and belief in 
conspiracy theories, was increased by a manipulation that lowered personal control.  However, it 
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was not until 2015 that social psychologists directly examined the relationship between 
conspiracy belief and pattern perception.  In a set of studies, Dieguez, Wagner-Egger and Gauvrit 
(2015) found no relation between conspiracy beliefs and the perception of non-randomness in 
strings of Xs and Os.  However, as they acknowledged, these null findings may have been 
attributable to the non-social and arbitrary nature of Xs and Os (e.g., compared to the apparently 
hidden figures in Whitson & GalinskyÕs, 2015, paintings).  
We (van Prooijen, Douglas & de Incocencio, 2018) also investigated the extent to which 
beliefs in conspiracy theories are rooted in pattern perception.  In Study 1 (N = 264 participants 
from the USA recruited from the crowdsourcing site Crowdflower), we measured belief in both 
well-known and fictitious conspiracy theories.  To measure belief in well-known conspiracy 
theories, we asked participants to rate their agreement with a series of statements (e.g., ÒThe US 
government had advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacksÓ).  To measure belief in fictitious 
conspiracy theories, we adapted the scale created by Swami et al. (2011) concerning the energy 
drink Red Bull (e.g., ÒThe official inventor of Red Bull pays 10 million Euro each year to keep 
food controllers quietÓ).  To measure pattern perception, we used the website Òrandom.orgÓ to 
generate 100 random coin tosses.  These were chunked into groups of 10 and for each group of 
coin tosses, participants were asked to rate on a single scale the extent to which the outcomes 
were completely random or completely determined.  Results revealed that pattern perception was 
significantly correlated with both measures of belief in conspiracy theories (see Table 2).  Pattern 
perception also predicted belief in supernatural phenomena such as mind reading and horoscopes 
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1983).  In a second study (N = 223 participants from the USA recruited 
from Crowdflower), we experimentally manipulated pattern search by asking participants to 
either look for patterns in the coin tosses, or we informed participants explicitly that the coin 
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tosses were random and that there were no patterns.  As in Study 1, participants were then asked 
to rate the extent to which they viewed the coin tosses as completely random or completely 
determined (to measure their pattern perception), and we also asked them to rate their agreement 
with a range of conspiracy theories and their experiences of supernatural phenomena.  Results 
revealed an indirect effect of the pattern search manipulation on conspiracy and supernatural 
beliefs via pattern perception.  This suggests that intuitively searching for patterns increased 
pattern perception, which predicted conspiracy beliefs and supernatural beliefs.  
TABLE 2 HERE 
 In a third study (N = 214 participants from the USA recruited from Crowdflower), we 
attempted to determine whether pattern perception in general predicts belief in conspiracy 
theories and supernatural phenomena, or if it is specifically illusory pattern perception that 
predicts conspiracy and supernatural beliefs.  It may be that perceptions of patterns in general 
predict these beliefs regardless of whether the patterns are real or illusory.  Or, it may be the case 
that pattern perception needs to be illusory to predict irrational beliefs.  That is, perception of 
patterns in random or chaotic stimuli specifically should predict these beliefs.  To attempt to tease 
these two explanations apart, we asked one group of participants to view paintings by Viktor 
Vasarely and another group to view paintings by Jackson Pollock.  VasarelyÕs paintings contain 
clear patterns, whereas PollockÕs paintings are more random and chaotic.  Should participants 
detect patterns in the Vasarely paintings, they would be real patterns.  Should participants detect 
patterns in the Pollock paintings, they would be illusory.  We reasoned that if general pattern 
perception (regardless of whether the patterns are illusory or real) predicts belief in conspiracy 
theories and the supernatural, then such beliefs should increase to the extent that people perceive 
patterns.  However, if only illusory pattern perception predicts conspiracy and supernatural 
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beliefs, then only perceiving patterns in the Pollock paintings should be associated with increased 
beliefs (and not the perceived real patterns in the Vasarely paintings).  Results supported the 
illusory pattern hypothesis.  Specifically, perceiving patterns in the Pollock paintings predicted 
belief in conspiracy theories and supernatural phenomena.  Perceiving patterns in the Vasarely 
paintings, however, was not significantly associated with belief in well-known conspiracy 
theories or fictitious conspiracy theories, and negatively predicted supernatural beliefs. These 
results suggest that only seeing patterns in the random and chaotic stimuli (i.e., illusory pattern 
perception) predicts irrational beliefs.  Perceiving patterns in non-random and structured stimuli 
(i.e., general pattern perception) does not.  
Two additional studies (Ns = 401 and 228 participants from the USA recruited via 
Crowdflower) found further evidence for the relationship between illusory pattern perception and 
both conspiracy beliefs and beliefs in the paranormal.  Study 4 demonstrated that pattern 
perception increased when people read a statement by a believer in conspiracy theories or 
supernatural phenomena (vs. a sceptic), and Study 5 showed that reading pro-conspiracy theory 
material (vs. anti-conspiracy material; see Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, b) increased the extent to 
which people generally believe events in the world to be related.  This, in turn, also predicted the 
extent to which people believed in conceptually unrelated conspiracy theories and supernatural 
phenomena.  Overall, these studies support the idea that conspiracy and supernatural beliefs are 
associated with a basic and normal cognitive function.  Sometimes however, this can lead people 
to detect patterns when they are not there.  
As we have seen, most of the studies linking conspiracy thinking to pattern perception 
have presented participants with randomly structured stimuli, in which no pattern objectively 
exists and in which pattern perception is therefore illusory. One limitation of this approach is that 
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real-world events, including those that attract conspiracy theories, are seldom—if ever—
randomly determined.  Rather than being undetermined, human behaviour is overdetermined, and 
the normal problem for observers is not to generate explanations ex nihilo but to select from a 
range of competing alternatives.  For example, the Death of Princess Diana was caused, among 
other things, by proximal factors including the blood alcohol level of her driver, her pursuit by 
paparazzi, and the design of the tunnel in which she died.  It was also the result of distal causal 
factors including the privileged lifestyles of the moneyed classes and the appetite of the public for 
stories about them.  The many conspiracy theories advanced for her death compete not only with 
each other but with these factors.  
Nonetheless, perceptions of patterns in random stimuli are relevant to explanations of 
such events because they depend on implausible causal reasoning—the willingness to suppose 
that events are connected by conventionally unlikely or even impossible causal links.  This 
permissive causal inference is at the heart of superstitious or “magical” thinking (Eckblad & 
Chapman, 1983), which causes people to draw causal links between objectively unrelated events 
as in the superstition that stepping on a crack in a pavement may bring about bad luck.  As we 
have seen, one study (Van Prooijen et al., 2018, Study 3) has shown that conspiracy belief was 
unrelated to perceptions of patterns in objectively structured stimuli.  However, in the case of a 
painting it is scarcely imaginable that a structure could exist without having been intended 
(caused) by the artist.  In the case of real-life event sequences such as the death of Princess 
Diana, the presence of an apparent structure is much more ambiguous.  It may or may not have 
been intended, and causal links may or may not exist between some of the events in the sequence.   
Following this reasoning, van der Wal, Sutton, Lange, and Braga (in press) examined the 
tendency to perceive causal relations between events that are objectively structured but between 
which no direct causal links may exist.  In Study 1 (N = 200 US participants recruited from 
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Mturk), participants were presented with six real-life, unlikely, and often entertaining spurious 
correlations compiled by Vigen (2015), for example between national chocolate consumption and 
Nobel Prizes.  As shown in Table 3, they found that beliefs in conspiracy theories spanning topics 
including 9/11, the JFK assassination, and Princess Diana’s death were positively correlated with 
the belief that spurious bivariate correlations were produced by a direct causal connection 
between the two variables.  In contrast, conspiracy thinking was unrelated to perceptions that 
spurious correlations reflected co-incidence or the operation of a third cause (imagine, for 
example, that wealthier countries might be prone to consuming more chocolate and producing 
more high-level research).  In their second study, van der Wal et al. showed that this effect held 
controlling for a range of control factors.  In their final study, they showed that conspiracy 
explanations for an event such as the death of a journalist increased when they were described as 
one of a cluster of similar events (as opposed to happening in isolation).  Furthermore, whether or 
not events comprised a cluster, participants endorsed conspiracy explanations more strongly 
when events were described as causally connected (vs. unconnected).  This finding provides 
direct evidence that perceiving unlikely causal connections between events contributes to belief 
in conspiracy theories.  
 TABLE 3 HERE 
Belief consistency 
 One of the most common findings in the literature is that if a person believes in one 
conspiracy theory then they are more likely to believe in others.  This phenomenon is so robust 
that participants’ agreement with conspiracy theories spanning topics as diverse as alien landings, 
the JFK assassination, the death of Princess Diana, and the origin of the AIDs virus are 
sufficiently correlated for their answers to comprise a highly reliable, unifactorial scale (Douglas 
& Sutton, 2011; Swami, Barron, Weis, Voracek, Stieger & Furnham, 2017).  These scales are 
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routinely used by many researchers, ourselves included, to study the theoretical causes and 
consequences of conspiracy beliefs.  Research has shown that participants’ belief in novel, 
experimentally constructed conspiracy theories is also strongly predicted by these scales (Swami 
et al., 2011).  This finding underpins the entire psychological literature on conspiracy belief, 
since it establishes that belief in conspiracy theories comprises a coherent psychological construct 
(Sutton & Douglas, 2014).    
The strong intercorrelation between diverse conspiracy beliefs may also have important 
theoretical implications for the basis of conspiracy beliefs.  Goertzel (1994) saw it as evidence of 
a monological belief system where ideas mutually support each other and lead to a sealed-off 
worldview where one conspiracy theory reinforces another, and so on.  If one conspiracy is 
possible then all conspiracies are possible.  However, social psychological research shows that 
while belief consistency is an important motivation (Gawronski & Strack, 2012), it is not always 
overriding, and people do hold contradictory positions (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & 
Sanford, 1950; Billig, 1996).  One reason for this is that there is pressure on beliefs to be 
consistent with higher-order knowledge structures, for example when beliefs have an ideological 
purpose.  Systems of belief serve a purpose in guiding emotional and behavioural responses, and 
their ÒgestaltÓ or overall consistency may be more important at a given time than consistency 
between peripheral beliefs in the system (Abelson, 1968; Heider, 1979; McGuire & Papageorgis, 
1961; Simon, Snow & Read, 2004).  Consistent with this reasoning, researchers have shown that 
a central judgement (e.g., that a defendant is guilty) may exert a powerful effect on evaluations of 
individual propositions or pieces of evidence (Read, Simon & Snow, 2003).  Perhaps the most 
vivid illustration of tolerance of local contradictions in the service of a higher-order coherence 
comes from the analysis of anti-Semitic stereotypes by Adorno et al. (1950), who showed that 
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Jewish people were simultaneously stereotyped as keen to isolate themselves from society 
(clannish) and keen to participate in it (cosmopolitan).  Although these stereotypes are not 
consistent with each other, they cohere with an overall derogation of Jewish people as alien 
intruders on Western civilisation.    
 The possibility that people may maintain multiple conspiracy beliefs about even a single 
event, even if these are inconsistent with each other, is suggested by even a cursory glance at the 
conspiracy theories that circulate around high-profile events.  For example, conspiracy theories 
surrounding the death of Diana, Princess of Wales vary from those asserting that she was 
murdered by the British royal family, to those arguing that she was helped by others to fake her 
own death so that she could live a life away from the probing lenses of the paparazzi.  Clearly, 
both cannot be true at the same time and these beliefs are not mutually supportive.   
 Inspired by these possibilities and social-psychological analyses of belief consistency, we 
(Wood, Douglas & Sutton, 2012) sought to understand how people might reconcile inconsistent 
conspiracy beliefs.  Specifically, we wanted to first establish if there is indeed evidence that 
people entertain contradictory conspiracy theories.  We then sought to determine whether the 
apparent coherence of contradictory conspiracy theories is driven not by direct relationships 
amongst the theories themselves (as in the monological account), but agreement between each 
separate conspiracy theory and higher-order beliefs about the world.  For example, the idea that 
people in power (e.g., governments) cover up their actions to deceive the public is central to most 
conspiracy theories.  Someone who believes in many conspiracy theories would begin to see 
powerful groups as fundamentally deceptive, and new conspiracy theories that they come across 
would seem more realistic (Read et al., 2003; Simon et al., 2004).  Going back to the example of 
the death of Princess Diana, belief in some kind of cover-upÑthe details do not matterÑwould 
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support (and be supported by) both the murder and faked death conspiracy theories.  Therefore, 
the contradiction between these two conspiracy theories might be overruled by their coherence 
with a broader conspiracist worldview of a cover-up.  We examined this hypothesis in two 
studies. 
 In one of these studies, participants (N = 102 British undergraduates) were asked to read a 
brief summary of the official story of Osama bin LadenÕs death.  They were then asked to rate the 
extent to which they agreed with the official story (i.e., ÒOsama bin Laden was killed in the 
American raidÓ) and then three conspiracy theories (ÒOsama bin Laden is still aliveÓ, ÒWhen the 
raid took place, Osama bin Laden was already deadÓ, and ÒThe actions of the Obama 
administration indicate that they are hiding some important or damaging piece of information 
about the raidÓ).  The first two conspiracy items are contradictoryÑOsama bin Laden cannot be 
both dead and alive.  The third conspiracy item was included to test the hypothesis that the 
relationship between the two contradictory conspiracy beliefs would be explained by belief in the 
overarching idea of a cover-up.  That is, the relationship between the two contradictory 
conspiracy beliefs would no longer be significant when belief in the cover-up was taken into 
account.  
The results revealed a significant positive correlation between endorsement ratings of the 
two contradictory conspiracy theories, which replicates the findings of a first study in this same 
paper showing high correlations between contradictory conspiracy theories concerning the death 
of Diana, Princess of Wales (N = 137 British undergraduates).  We next examined the extent to 
which belief in a cover-up explained the positive relationship between the two contradictory 
conspiracy theories.  Using a multiple regression, endorsement of the cover-up item significantly 
predicted belief in both conspiracy theories.  However, endorsement of this item fully explained 
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the relationship between the two conspiracy beliefs (see Figure 1).  Therefore, the correlation in 
endorsement of the two contradictory theories is explainable entirely by their connection with 
belief in a deceptive cover-up by authority.  Conspiracy theories appear to be defined not by 
adherence to a particular alternative account, but by opposition to the official story and a belief 
that deception is taking place.  Further evidence of this was provided by our archival examination 
of online comments to news articles (Wood & Douglas, 2013, 2015) where conspiracist 
comments appeared to be based on a rejection of official explanations rather than on proposing 
alternative explanations.  This tendency can be understood as a reflection of an underlying 
conspiracist worldview in which the details of individual conspiracy theories are not as important 
as a generalised rejection of official explanations (for further articulation and alternative 
interpretations see Sutton & Douglas, 2014). 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Projection 
Hofstadter (1964) was heavily influenced by psychodynamic theory.  As a result, 
Hofstadter saw conspiracy belief as arising from unconscious conflicts and processes.  One of 
these was projection.  ÒIt is hard to resist the conclusionÓ, wrote Hofstadter (1964, p. 80), Òthat 
this enemy is a projection of the selfÓ, where Òthis enemyÓ was a metaphor for a person or 
persons alleged to be part of some powerful, far-reaching conspiracy.  There has been relatively 
little systematic research into the psychodynamic conception of projection, in which traits, 
motives or behaviours are projected onto others to avoid recognising them in oneself.  However, 
there is extensive support for projection as a social-cognitive process in which the observer, 
lacking more direct or objective information, relies on what they know about him/herself when 
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making judgments about what other people might be thinking, feeling and doing when more 
reliable or objective information is missing (Ames, 2004; Krueger, 2000).  
Building on this social-cognitive conceptualisation of projection as a sense-making 
mechanism, we (Douglas & Sutton, 2011) provided the first empirical test of the role of 
projection in conspiracy belief.  In two studies (N = 189 and 60 British undergraduate students), 
we examined whether peopleÕs endorsement of conspiracy theories depends, in part, on whether 
they themselves are willing to conspire.  We reasoned that when evaluating a conspiracy theory, 
people might use projection to try to understand whether those accused of conspiring in some 
way actually might have done so.  For example, people might be less likely to dismiss the 
conspiracy theory that Princess Diana was murdered by MI6 if they believe that they personally 
would have done the same thing if they were in that position.  In other words, a personÕs 
perception that ÒI would do itÓ informs their perception that ÒThey did itÓ.   
 The second of these studies was an experiment aimed at testing this hypothesis, where we 
assumed that peopleÕs willingness to conspire would be determined by their own personal 
morality (cf. Bandura, 2006; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).  We therefore directly manipulated 
participantsÕ perception of their own personal morality.  Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two conditions.  An experimental group was asked to think of, and write about, a time 
when they behaved in a moral and decent manner by helping another individual.  According to 
self-perception theory (Bem, 1967, 1972), people infer their attitudes and dispositions by 
observing their own behaviour.  We therefore reasoned that by recalling a time when they 
behaved in a moral and decent manner, people would perceive themselves as less likely to 
conspire to perform negative acts.  A control group did not engage in this task.  Following this 
manipulation, participants were asked to rate their agreement with a range of conspiracy theories 
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(e.g., ÒThe AIDS virus was created in a laboratoryÓ), but crucially, to also rate the extent to 
which they would be personally willing to engage in each conspiracy (e.g., ÒIf you were a 
scientist, would you have created the AIDS virus?Ó).  They were asked to indicate their 
willingness on a scale from ÒNever under any circumstancesÓ to ÒProbably yesÓ.  We predicted 
that participants in the ÒmoralÓ condition would endorse conspiracy theories to a lesser degree 
than those in the control condition, and that this effect would be mediated by willingness to 
engage in the alleged conspiracies.  Results supported these predictions (see Figure 2) and 
provided experimental evidence for correlational findings in Study 1.  In Study 1, the morality 
manipulation was replaced with a measure of Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970).  The 
rationale was the sameÑbut we expected that Machiavellianism would positively predict belief 
in conspiracy theories via projectionÑand this hypothesis was supported.  Together, these two 
studies provide further evidence that belief in conspiracy theories results from normal social 
cognitive processesÑin this case the projection of oneÕs own moral tendencies onto others.  If 
people believe that they would take part in the conspiracy themselves, then it is plausible that 
others would have done so, too.  
FIGURE 2 HERE 
Other social psychological findings provide further support for the argument that 
conspiracy theories result from basic cognitive and social cognitive processes, rather than being a 
simple product of paranoia and delusion. Conspiracy beliefs have been linked to the conjunction 
fallacyÑan error in probabilistic reasoning where people overestimate the likelihood of co-
occurring events (Brotherton & French, 2014; Dagnall, Denovon, Drinkwater, Parker & Clough, 
2017).  Also, lower levels of analytic thinking have been linked to conspiracy belief (Ståhl, & 
van Prooijen, 2018; Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran & Furnham, 2014).  All of these findings 
                CONSPIRACY THEORIES   21 
suggest that conspiracy theories are a normal by-product of the way people think and organise 
information about the world. 
Motivations 
Our programme of research also suggests that beliefs in conspiracy theories are dependent 
on peopleÕs motivations.  In this section, we focus on our research highlighting the role of 
powerful, widely shared motivations that are well documented in social psychological theory and 
research.  These are the motivation to feel unique or distinct from others, the motivation to justify 
the social status quo, and the motivation to feel safe and secure in the social environment.  
The motivation to be unique 
First, we have shown that need for uniqueness predicts the extent to which people believe 
in conspiracy theories (Lantian, Muller, Nurra & Douglas, 2017).  Need for uniqueness is defined 
as the need or desire to be different from other people (Lynn & Snyder, 2002).  It is a stable trait 
but it also responds to feedback that the self is not unique from others (Snyder & Fromkin, 1977; 
1980).  Social psychological research has found that people with higher need for uniqueness are 
more interested in scarce or unique commodities because they set the self apart from other people 
(e.g., Brock & Brannon, 1992; Lynn & Harris, 1997; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980).  Snyder and 
Fromkin (1980) suggested that people can also fulfil their need for uniqueness by adopting 
particular beliefs.  By cultivating original views, they express the unique nature of their 
personality (Abelson, 1986).  We reasoned that people high in need for uniqueness should be 
more likely than others to believe in conspiracy theories because such theories represent 
unconventional, original, and scarce information.  People who believe in conspiracy theories can 
feel special because they feel that they are enlightened and others are in the dark.  As Billig 
(1987) noted: ÒThe conspiracy theory offers the chance of hidden, important, and immediate 
                CONSPIRACY THEORIES   22 
knowledge, so that the believer can become an expert, possessed of a knowledge not held even by 
the so-called expertsÓ (p. 132).  We tested this hypothesis in four studies.   
 In Study 1 (N = 190 French participants, the majority of whom were university students) 
we first asked participants to complete a French translation of a scale measuring belief in 
conspiracy theories (Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2010).  Afterwards, we asked 
them to rate the scarcity of the information that they might have used to answer the conspiracy 
theory questions.  We did so using three items (e.g., ÒThe information I used to answer the 
questions in the previous section wasÉÓ) and participants rated information scarcity on a scale 
from 1 (disclosed to the public) to 9 (hidden from the public).  Results revealed that participants 
with higher beliefs in conspiracy theories were also more likely to feel that they possessed scarce 
information about the events in question.   
In Study 2 (N = 208 from the USA recruited via MTurk), we tested our hypothesis more 
directly, examining the relationship between dispositional need for uniqueness and beliefs in 
conspiracy theories.  In this study, participants completed a scale measuring need for uniqueness 
(Lynn & Harris, 1997) where participants were asked to rate their agreement with items such as 
ÒI prefer being different from other peopleÓ.  We also measured beliefs in conspiracy theories 
using a different scale from Study 1 (Brotherton, French & Pickering, 2013).  Results revealed, as 
predicted, that need for uniqueness was positively correlated with belief in conspiracy theories.  
Next, we argued that a situational increase in the need for uniqueness should increase adherence 
to conspiracy theories. In the third (N = 143 French undergraduates) and fourth studies (N = 375 
people recruited online via French-speaking forums), we therefore tested the causal effect of need 
for uniqueness on conspiracy beliefs by experimentally manipulating need for uniqueness.  We 
predicted that creating the need for uniqueness should result in higher conspiracy beliefs.  
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 In Study 3, participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions in 
order to manipulate need for uniqueness.  This manipulation took the form of a writing task 
where participants were asked to think and write about the importance of individuality (vs. 
conformity), which is designed to increase (vs. decrease) the need for uniqueness.  Participants 
then read a fictional newspaper article about a bus accident in Moldova in which 45 people died, 
crucially including eight politicians who were members of the political opposition at the time of 
the event.  The account of the event was ambiguous and designed in such a way to raise 
suspicions of conspiracy.  Participants were then asked to rate their agreement with four 
statements.  Two were allegations of conspiracy (e.g., ÒThe coach crash was deliberately planned 
by the established power in the countryÓ) and two referred to non-conspiracy explanations (e.g., 
ÒThis event is the result of an unfortunate accident due to uncontrollable factors [e.g., bad 
weather, mechanical failure, etc.]Ó).  The latter two items were reverse-scored and the items were 
combined to form a scale of conspiracy beliefs.  Results revealed a marginal effect of the 
experimental condition such that participants in the individuality condition scored higher in 
conspiracy beliefs than those in the conformity condition.   In Study 4 we used a different 
manipulation of need for uniqueness and a more diverse sample to re-test the hypothesis.  In this 
study, we adapted a procedure used to manipulate the self-concept (Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989; 
Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990).  Specifically, this previous research showed that people who 
were led to believe that being extraverted (or introverted) was related to positive consequences 
were more motivated to view themselves as extraverted (or introverted).  In order to increase (vs. 
decrease) peopleÕs need to feel unique, we led participants to believe that trying to be unique (or 
trying to be like other people) was related to positive consequences (e.g., better academic 
success, higher salary).  We used the same method as Study 3 to measure beliefs in conspiracy 
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theories.  Results were very similar to Study 3, again revealing a marginal effect of the need for 
uniqueness manipulation on conspiracy beliefs.  However, when we meta-analysed the results of 
Studies 3 and 4, we foundÑas hypothesisedÑthat participants in the high need for uniqueness 
condition believed conspiracy theories more than those in the low need for uniqueness condition.  
These findings were corroborated by Imhoff and Lamberty (2017), whose findings also linked 
conspiracy beliefs with need for uniqueness.  Although the effect may be quite small, believing in 
conspiracy theories appears to provide people with the means to stand apart from the rest, if they 
have the motivation to be different.  
The motivation to justify the system 
Both across and within disciplines, opinion has differed on the political consequences of 
conspiracy theories.  Some scholars argue that they are subversive and empowering, providing 
alternative narratives to groups who wish to reject and challenge the status quo (e.g., Sapountzis 
& Condor, 2013).  Others argue that they are essentially counterproductive, deterring resistance 
by breeding helplessness in the face of disadvantage or misdirecting resistance by scapegoating 
real or imagined enemies (e.g, Uscinski & Parent, 2014).  The legal scholar Fenster (1999, xiii) 
eloquently acknowledges both perspectives:  
Articulating a necessary distance between Òthe peopleÓ and ÒpowerÓ, conspiracy 
theory draws on the most simplistic, disabling, and dangerous interpretations of 
political order, including fascism, totalitarianism, and anti-Semitism Ð yet it also 
represents a populist possibility, a resistance to power that implicitly imagines a 
better, collective future. 
In our work (Jolley, Douglas & Sutton, 2018), we have made an attempt to examine empirically 
what the political consequences of conspiracy belief might be in terms of support for (vs. 
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opposition to) the social status quo.  From a social psychological perspective, one paradox of 
conspiracy belief is that it conflicts with the motivation to justify the social status quo.  
According to system justification theory, people are motivated to hold positive views about 
existing social, economic and political arrangements (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994), because doing so 
symbolically satisfies relational, epistemic, and existential needs.  Threats to social systems 
threaten these needs, causing people to look for ways to defend, bolster or rationalise the status 
quo, even at the expense of their own interests (Jost et al., 2004).  One may ask then, why do 
people believe in conspiracy theories, which are critical of social systems?   
We proposed that conspiracy theories may paradoxically bolster support for the status quo 
when its legitimacy is threatened.  We refer to the words of Goertzel (1994) who said Òa 
conspiracy theory gives believers someone tangible to blame for their perceived predicament, 
instead of blaming it on impersonal or abstract social forcesÓ (p. 494).  In other words, conspiracy 
theories identify a small group of negative influences within the system that are responsible for 
the bad things that happen.  These negative influences are not representative of the system as a 
whole because they only have their own interests at heart.  People can therefore uphold their 
belief that the system is fair and functional by using conspiracy theories to explain why things go 
wrong.  This idea echoes the social psychological principle of subtyping, which preserves group 
stereotypes by categorising people who violate them as members of subgroups who are not 
characteristic of the group as a whole (Kunda & Oleson, 1995).  The idea also echoes social 
psychological findings such as the Ôblack sheep effectÕ, where people derogate deviant ingroup 
members more harshly than outgroup members in order to preserve the belief that typical ingroup 
members are better than typical outgroup members (Marques & Paez, 1994).  Likewise, by 
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blaming a small number of conspiring people for the ills of society, people can believe that 
society is still functioning as it should.  We conducted three experiments to test this hypothesis. 
Study 1 (N = 120 UK participants recruited via Crowdflower) examined whether 
conspiracy theorising would increase (vs. not increase) in response to Òsystem threatÓ 
information.  In this study, we used the threat manipulation adapted from previous research (e.g., 
Jost, Kivetz, Rubini, Guermandi & Mosso, 2005) in which participants read a statement about the 
current social, economic and political circumstances in the United Kingdom.  In one condition 
this was framed as positive (e.g., ÒPeople feel safer and securer than they used to, and there is a 
sense of confidence and optimism regarding the countryÕs futureÓÑsystem affirming) and in the 
other it was negative (e.g., ÒPeople do not feel as safe and secure as they used to, and there is a 
sense of uncertainty regarding the countryÕs futureÓÑsystem threat).  We then measured belief in 
well-known conspiracy theories and general notions of conspiracy.  We hypothesised that if the 
motivation to restore the status quo motivates belief in conspiracy theories, then such beliefs 
should increase under system threat.  The opposite prediction should hold if, instead, conspiracy 
theories undermine support for the status quo, in which case they should be rejected as additional 
system threats.  We found support for the first hypothesis.  Endorsement of both well-known and 
general notions of conspiracy was higher in the system threat vs. system affirmation condition.  
Study 2 (N = 190 British undergraduates) directly tested the hypothesis that exposure to 
conspiracy theories would buffer (vs. aggravate) the negative effects of system threat on 
satisfaction with the status quo.  We manipulated system threat as in Study 1, and then exposed 
half of the participants to conspiracy theories about the death of Princess Diana whereas the other 
half did not read this material (control).  This manipulation was adapted from a study by Douglas 
and Sutton (2008), which was successful in increasing conspiracy beliefs.  We predicted that, if 
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conspiracy theories help people defend the system from threat, the negative effects of system 
threat on satisfaction with the status quo should be lessened when people are also exposed to 
conspiracy theories.  Findings supported this hypothesis (Table 4).  For participants in the system 
threat condition, exposure to conspiracy theories increased satisfaction with the status quo 
relative to control.  There was no difference between conditions after the system affirmation 
induction.  
TABLE 4 HERE  
The final study (N = 166 UK participants recruited via Crowdflower) tested our proposed 
mechanism for this effectÑspecifically that conspiracy theories allow people to maintain positive 
views about social systems because they attribute negative events in society to a small number of 
negative influences within the social system.  In this study, we exposed all participants to system 
threat and then half of the participants to conspiracy theories.  All participants then rated the 
extent to which various social problems (e.g., pollution, inequality) are caused by individuals or 
small groups, as opposed to broader problems within the social system.  For each social problem, 
this question was asked with the two options (individuals and small groups vs. broader problems 
within the social system) at either pole.  Participants then rated their satisfaction with the status 
quo, as in Study 2.  We expected to observe an indirect causal path in which participants exposed 
to conspiracy theories (vs. not) would be more likely to blame societal problems on the actions of 
individuals and small groups than on flaws present in society (i.e., blaming a small number of 
negative influences rather than the system), and in turn, to express increased satisfaction with the 
status quo.  Results supported our predictions (see Figure 3).  Therefore, this is evidence that at 
least some conspiracy theories appear to serve the function of bolsteringÑrather than 
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subvertingÑthe status quo.  Thus another reason why people believe in conspiracy theories may 
be because they are motivated to feel positive about the system in which they live.  
FIGURE 3 HERE 
Safety and security 
Some of our other research suggests that people might turn to conspiracy theories partly 
because they have had negative childhood experiences (Green & Douglas, 2018).  Specifically, 
people appear to turn to conspiracy theories to meet existential needs (Douglas, Sutton et al., 
2017), and the origins of these needs might be understood through the lens of attachment theory 
(Bowlby, 1969/1982).  The primary goal of attachment behaviour is to alleviate feelings of 
anxiety and increase a sense of security.  Attachment styles (avoidant, anxious and secure) result 
from early childhood experiences with caregivers and can persist throughout life, influencing 
adult bonds and relationships.  Although attachment theory arose in the context of biological and 
developmental psychology, social psychologists have shown that attachment style can predict an 
array of social psychological phenomena, including intragroup processes (Rom & Mikulincer, 
2003), sexism (Hart, Hung, Glick, & Dinero, 2012), prejudice (Boag & Carnelley, 2016) 
discrimination (Boag & Carnelly, 2016) and co-operation vs. defection in social dilemmas 
(McClure, Bartz, & Lydon, 2013).  We reasoned that a specific attachment styleÑanxious 
attachmentÑwould be associated with belief in conspiracy theories amongst adults.  We 
hypothesised that this would occur because anxious attachment style is characterised by a 
preoccupation with security, negative views of outgroups, sensitivity to threats, and a tendency to 
exaggerate the seriousness of such threats.  People with secure and avoidant attachment styles, on 
the other hand, are less sensitive to threats and do not exaggerate such threats.  We conducted two 
studies to examine this hypothesis.   
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In the first study (N = 246 Mturk participants, 89% from the USA) we tested the 
relationship between anxious attachment style and belief in conspiracy theories whilst also 
controlling for other known predictors of conspiracy belief.  Specifically, we controlled for right-
wing authoritarianism (RWA; Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sandford, 1950; 
Altemeyer, 1981) and social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 
1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), both of which have been found to predict conspiracy beliefs 
(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Bruder et al., 2013; Grzesiak-Feldman & Irzycka, 2009).  We also 
controlled for the extent to which people view the world as a battle between good and evil (i.e., a 
Manichean worldview), which is also associated with conspiracy belief (Oliver & Wood, 2014).  
Finally, we controlled for individual differences in interpersonal trust and demographic variables 
(Abalakina-Paap, 1999; Douglas et al., 2016; Goertzel, 1994).   
Using a multiple regression analysis, we tested whether anxious attachment predicts belief 
in conspiracy theories whilst taking into account other predictors.  We found, as hypothesised, 
that anxious attachment significantly predicted conspiracy belief whereas avoidant (and secure) 
attachment did not.  SDO, interpersonal trust, and Manichean worldview also remained 
significant predictors of conspiracy belief.  Anxious attachment therefore appears to be a unique 
predictor of belief in conspiracy theories (see Table 5).  A second study (N = 230 participants 
recruited from the crowdsourcing site Prolific Academic, 99% British) replicated this relationship 
and also showed that anxious attachment predicted belief in well-known conspiracy theories (as 
measured by Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Douglas et al., 2016) and conspiracy theories about groups 
(i.e., the idea that specific groups such as bankers and politicians conspire against others).  
Conspiracy beliefs therefore appear to respond to the motivation to restore security and control.  
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This may be lacking as a result of an insecure attachment style that develops in childhood and 
persists into adulthood.  
TABLE 5 HERE 
 Other research supports the idea that motivations are important determinants of 
conspiracy beliefs.  People also appear motivated to adopt conspiracy theories when they have 
high cognitive need for closure (Marchlewska, Cichocka, & Kossowska, 2018), and have a desire 
to aggrandise or uphold an image of the self and the social group (Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec 
de Zavala, & Olechowski, 2016; Golec de Zavala and Cichocka, 2012).  For example, by viewing 
other groups as evil conspirators, people can serve their need to maintain a positive image of their 
ingroups.  Conspiracy beliefs also appear to be motivated by political ideology, such that people 
believe in conspiracy theories that suit their own political leanings and interests, and disbelieve 
those that do not (e.g., Uscinski & Parent, 2014).  People also appear especially motivated to use 
conspiracy explanations in times of crisis (Kofta, Sędek, & Sławuta, 2011; van Prooijen & 
Douglas, 2017).  Research therefore supports the idea that belief in conspiracy theories can be 
viewed as a response to a diverse range of common social psychological motives. 
Conspiracy theories have important social consequences 
The normality of conspiracy beliefs and their relation to all levels of analysis in social 
psychology raises an important questionÑdo conspiracy theories have consequences for 
individuals, groups and society?  All of the theoretical perspectives across all of the academic 
disciplines that have engaged with conspiracy theory have one thing in common: they assume 
that conspiracy theories matterÑthat is, that they exert a role in shaping the experience, thoughts, 
feelings and behaviour of individuals, and that they may play a role in shaping broader social and 
political realities.  Social psychology is well placed to test this basic assumption that conspiracy 
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theories have effects.  Thus far, research has focused primarily on effects that most people would 
agree are essentially negativeÑhighlighting how conspiracy theories may undermine social life 
(for an overview, see Douglas, Sutton Jolley & Wood, 2015).  Specifically, there are several 
ways in which conspiracy theories have been found to be potentially harmful in the domains of 
politics, the environment, health, and also in determining how people feel about their workplace.  
They also appear to influence people without their awareness.  We will outline these findings in 
the following section.   
Influence without awareness 
We first investigated the extent to which conspiracy theories can influence peopleÕs 
attitudes (Douglas & Sutton, 2008).  In this study, we asked two questions: (1) do conspiracy 
theories change peopleÕs attitudes? and (2) if so, are people aware that their attitudes have 
changed?  We conducted an experimental study (N = 96 British undergraduates) to answer these 
questions.  Participants were assigned to a control or experimental group.  The participants were 
drawn from the same population of psychology undergraduate students and were randomly 
assigned to the groups, so they did not differ demographically.  The control group were asked to 
rate their own (control self) and othersÕ (control other) perceived agreement with a series of 
conspiracy-related statements about the events surrounding the death of Princess Diana in 1997.  
In the experimental group, participants were first asked to read some information containing 
popular conspiracy theories about the event.  They were then asked to rate their own (current self) 
and othersÕ (current other) perceived agreement with the same items.  They were also asked to 
rate their retrospective attitudes (i.e., what they perceive their attitudes to have been before 
reading the materialÑretrospective self) and the same for others (retrospective other).  Using this 
design, it was possible to compare the perceived (current Ð retrospective) attitude change for both 
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self and others, with true attitude change (current self Ð control self) to examine participantsÕ 
accuracy of judgements of their own attitude change and othersÕ attitude change.  Although in 
this design the current and control measures for the self and others were taken from different 
participants, by sampling from the same population the control group can be treated as a baseline 
for the experimental group.  We can therefore identify whether participantsÕ perceptions of their 
own and othersÕ attitude change were accurate.  In other words, the comparisons between the 
control and experimental groups act as proxies for actual attitude change ratings.   
We hypothesised that conspiracy theories would influence peopleÕs attitudes, but that 
people would not necessarily be aware that their attitudes had changed.  This finding has been 
shown in other domains (e.g., attitudes about gun control, attitudes about global warming; 
Douglas & Sutton, 2004) and we expected that, as in other domains, people would perceive their 
attitudes to be unchanged after reading conspiracy-related material.  Specifically, participants 
should rate their Ôcurrent selfÕ and Ôretrospective selfÕ attitudes to be the same.  However, when 
we compare perceived attitude change for others (current Ð retrospective) with participantsÕ 
actual attitude change (current self Ð control self), people are likely to be accurate about the 
attitude change of others, but underestimate the impact of the conspiracy theories on themselves.   
Findings were as predicted.  First, participants were more in agreement with the 
conspiracy theories surrounding Princess DianaÕs death in the experimental group than in the 
control group, demonstrating that the conspiracy theories were indeed influential.  Furthermore, 
whilst participantsÕ estimates of othersÕ attitude change were accurate, participants 
underestimated the extent to which their own attitudes were influenced (see Table 6).  These 
findings therefore also suggest that the influence of conspiracy theories could be subtle rather 
than blatant.  
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TABLE 6 HERE 
Engagement with politics 
Since discovering that conspiracy theories can influence peopleÕs attitudes about events 
without their awareness, we theorised that conspiracy theories may influence peopleÕs attitudes 
and behavioural intentions in specific domains.  We turned our attention first to politics.  Many 
conspiracy theories concern the shady and sinister actions of government operations, which could 
plausibly influence the extent to which people intend to engage in the political system.  To 
examine the effects of conspiracy theories on political decisions, we conducted an experiment (N 
= 168 British undergraduate and postgraduate students) where participants read a narrative that 
either supported conspiracy theories about governments (conspiracy), or refuted such conspiracy 
theories (mainstream; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a).  A sample of text from the conspiracy condition 
was: 
ÒÉTo take the example of Princess DianaÕs death, it is no secret that the 
British government were discontented with Princess DianaÕs involvement with 
Dodi Fayed and also with her increasing involvement in politicsÉ one must 
therefore question the claim that her death was simply a tragic accident ÉÓ 
An example of text from the mainstream condition was: 
ÒÉTo take the example of Princess DianaÕs death, it is no secret that Princess 
DianaÕs popularity made some members of the government uneasy. However, 
there is no evidence at all to suggest that the British government were involved 
in her death... her death was simply a tragic accident ... Ó 
We expected lower intentions to vote in an upcoming election in the conspiracy condition than in 
the mainstream condition.  We further tested potential mediators of this predicted effect.  
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Specifically, we measured interpersonal trust (Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999), 
feelings of powerlessness (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999), and uncertainty (van Prooijen & 
Jostmann, 2013), which are all known correlates of conspiracy beliefs as we explained earlier in 
this article.  We also tested the potential mediating role of disillusionment with the political 
system.  As expected, exposure to conspiracy theories decreased participantsÕ intentions to vote.  
Further, this effect was mediated by feelings of powerlessness.  Although exposure to conspiracy 
theories significantly influenced feelings of powerlessness and uncertainty, when controlling for 
each other, only powerlessness remained as a significant mediator (see Figure 4).  
FIGURE 4 HERE!
Environmental behaviour 
We conducted a very similar experiment (N = 214 British undergraduate students) to 
examine whether this effect of conspiracy theories occurs in another domainÑconcerning 
conspiracy theories about climate science (Douglas & Sutton, 2015; Uscinski, Douglas & 
Lewandowsky, 2017).  Participants read a narrative either supporting climate change conspiracy 
theories (e.g., that climate change is a hoaxÑconspiracy condition) or refuting them (mainstream 
condition) and were asked to rate their likelihood of engaging in a range of climate-friendly 
behaviours.  There were seven statements in total, asking participants about their intended 
behaviours over the next 12 months (e.g., ÒDo you intend to use energy-efficiency as a selection 
criterion when buying a light bulb or household appliance?Ó, ÒDo you intend to walk or cycle 
more than driving or using public transport?Ó).  In this experiment, we also included a control 
condition in which participants read no material.  We found that intentions to engage in climate-
friendly behaviours were significantly lower in the conspiracy condition than the mainstream 
condition and the control condition.  Intentions to engage in climate-friendly behaviours were not 
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significantly different in the anti-conspiracy condition relative to the control.  We again included 
a set of potential mediators and found that the effect of conspiracy theories on climate 
behavioural intentions was mediated by feelings of powerlessness (e.g., ÒI feel that my actions 
will not affect the outcome of climate changeÓ, uncertainty (e.g., ÒI feel uncertain as to whether 
climate change is a significant problemÓ, and disillusionment (e.g., I am very disappointed with 
the climate scientistsÓ).   
Health-related behaviour 
In recent years, vaccination has declined in many regions of the world (Health Protection 
Agency 2008) and this is a particular concern for the combined Measles, Mumps and Rubella 
vaccination (Burgess, Burgess & Leask, 2006).  One contributor to this problem seems to have 
been the 1998 publication in the Lancet by Andrew Wakefield that linked the MMR vaccination 
to the appearance of autism.  Although this research has been discredited and retracted, some 
doubts still remain and conspiracy theories about vaccine efficacy and safety are common (Kata, 
2012).  According to the most popular conspiracy theories, pharmaceutical companies stand to 
make such huge profits that they hide information that vaccines do not work and are unsafe 
(Offit, 2010).  Some scholars have speculated that conspiracy theories are a barrier to vaccine 
uptake (e.g., Chung, 2009) and we tested this assertion empirically.   
In two studies, we also tested the role of conspiracy theories in determining peopleÕs 
intentions to engage in vaccination behaviour (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b).  In the first study, 
which was correlational, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed or 
disagreed with statements related to a range of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories (e.g., ÒVaccines 
are harmful, and this fact is covered upÓ).  Participants (N = 89 British people), who were all 
parents, were then presented with a scenario depicting a fictitious child.  They were asked to 
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imagine that they needed to make a decision whether or not to have the child vaccinated against a 
specific (fictional) disease.  We found that anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs indeed predicted 
vaccination intentions.  Specifically, participants who endorsed anti-vaccine conspiracy theories 
to a greater extent reported weaker intentions to vaccinate.  Furthermore, anti-vaccine conspiracy 
beliefs were associated with three potential mediator variables that had been examined in 
previous research: disillusionment, powerlessness (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a), trust towards 
authorities, and also the perceived dangers of vaccines (e.g., ÒVaccines lead to allergiesÓ).  When 
all factors were taken into account, each significantly mediated the relationship between anti-
vaccine conspiracy beliefs and vaccination intentions (see Table 7).  
TABLE 7 HERE 
 A second study (N = 246 residents of the USA recruited from Mturk) found experimental 
support for this finding.  Participants were exposed to material supporting anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories (vs. anti-conspiracy information or a control condition).  An excerpt from the 
anti-vaccine conspiracy information is as follows: 
ÒÉ further, there is a significant amount of evidence that vaccines can hurt more than 
they help.  For example, by the year 2000, tens of thousands of reactions to vaccines, 
including deaths, were reported.  One must magnify these figures tenfold, because it is 
estimated that 90% of doctors do not report incidents ÉÓ. 
An excerpt from the anti-conspiracy article is as follows: 
ÒÉ further, there is little evidence to suggest that vaccines are harmful.  The side effects 
are minimal and whilst millions of people have been immunised over the years, less than 
.005% have ever had an adverse reaction to a vaccine ÉÓ 
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Participants were then asked to indicate their intention to have a fictitious child vaccinated as in 
Study 1.  The same potential mediators were measured.  Results revealed that participants who 
were exposed to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories felt less inclined to have a fictitious child 
vaccinated against a made-up disease compared those in the anti-vaccine and control conditions.  
This effect was again mediated by the perceived dangers of vaccines, feelings of powerlessness, 
disillusionment, and trust in authorities.  
Commitment to the workplace 
 Across three studies, we have also shown that perceived conspiracies in the workplace 
are associated with decreased engagement in the workplace (Douglas & Leite, 2017).  To 
illustrate one study (N = 202 participants from the USA recruited from Mturk), participants were 
asked to rate their agreement with several statements about conspiracies occurring in their own 
workplace (e.g., ÒA small group of people makes all of the decisions to suit their own interestsÓ, 
ÒA small group of people secretly manipulates eventsÓÑsee also van Prooijen & de Vries, 2017).  
They were also asked to rate their intention to leave their current position (e.g., ÒDo you intend to 
leave your job in the next 12 monthsÓ, ÒHow likely is it that you will leave your job in the next 
12 monthsÓ) as a measure of turnover intentions.  We tested the prediction that higher perceptions 
of workplace conspiracies would predict higher turnover intentions.  We also tested the 
mechanisms that may mediate this relationship.  Specifically, we reasoned that the relationship 
between organisational conspiracy belief and turnover intentions could be mediated by 
organisational identification (e.g., ÒWhat my workplace stands for is important to meÓ), 
organisational commitment (ÒI would be happy to spend the rest of my working life in my 
workplaceÓ), and job satisfaction (e.g., To what extent are you satisfied with É Òyour work in 
general?Ó, Òyour opportunities for advancement?).   Results revealed evidence for these mediated 
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relationships (see Figure 9).  That is, the more people perceived conspiracies to be occurring in 
their workplace, the more they were inclined to want to leave that workplaceÑa relationship 
mediated by identification, commitment and satisfaction with the job.  
Although results suggest that conspiracy beliefs predict turnover intentions via these 
mediators, this does not provide conclusive support for the hypothesised causal direction.  In two 
subsequent experimental studies, we therefore directly manipulated organisational conspiracy 
theories.  In the first of these studies (N = 119 British workers recruited from Prolific Academic), 
we manipulated perceived organisational climate by asking participants to imagine working in 
either a positive workplace where employees have a lot of autonomy or a negative workplace 
where they do not.  We again measured organisational commitment and job satisfaction.  
Findings revealed that a negative organisational climate increased belief in organisational 
conspiracy theories, which in turn influenced commitment, satisfaction, and led to higher 
turnover intentions.   
In a third study (N = 202 participants from the USA recruited via Mturk), we manipulated 
exposure to organisational conspiracy theories using a method similar to that used by Jolley and 
Douglas (2014a, b).  Participants were asked to read a paragraph carefully and imagine that they 
are working for a large consultancy firm and had been employed there for five years.  One half of 
the participants (conspiracy condition), were presented with a scenario in which a conspiracy had 
occurred or was occurring.  There were three scenarios which were counterbalanced.  In the first 
scenario, a leaked email suggested that the management had plotted to fix the employee of the 
year award.  In the second scenario, a leaked email suggested that the management team were 
secretly planning to cut the company pay budget to give higher bonuses to themselves.  In the 
third scenario, it was suspected that certain employees were being handpicked for better and more 
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lucrative projects than others.  Turnover intentions again served as the dependent measure, and 
we included organisational commitment and job satisfaction as potential mediators.  As in Study 
2, exposure to organisational conspiracy theories increased turnover intentions, and this effect 
was mediated by commitment and job satisfaction (see Figure 5).  
FIGURE 5 HERE 
 On the whole, our research suggests that conspiracy theories have potentially negative 
social consequences.  They tend to reduce engagement in important social domains and are 
associated with feelings of powerlessness, disillusionment and mistrust.  However, this is not 
always the case.  For example, Imhoff and Bruder (2014) found in one context that beliefs in 
conspiracy theories motivated rather than attenuated social action aimed at changing the status 
quo.  Different contexts may elicit different effects of conspiracy theorising and exposure to 
conspiracy theories.  It would be interesting and useful to further investigate the effects of 
conspiracy theories on political engagement in particular.  There was much controversy 
surrounding both the 2016 Brexit referendum and the US election of Donald Trump.  In each 
case, accusations of conspiracy were rife and so-called Òfake newsÓ was a prominent feature of 
both campaigns (Douglas, Ang & Deravi, 2017).  Investigating when conspiracy theories induce 
political apathy and when they encourage people to take action to bring about social change is an 
important topic for future research.  Further investigating how conspiracy theories spread across 
digital networks over time, and the relationships between conspiracy theories and fake news is 
also important.  
How do we curb the influence of conspiracy theories? 
Given the potentially detrimental effects of conspiracy theories on engagement with 
important social, political and health processes, an important next step is to understand how to 
                CONSPIRACY THEORIES   40 
intervene to prevent these effects.  Research on this topic is limited at present.  Orosz et al. (2016) 
found that rational counter-arguments and ridiculing conspiracy believers were both effective in 
reducing conspiracy beliefs.  Banas and Miller (2013) also examined the effectiveness of counter-
arguments.  Participants in their study were asked to view a clip from the film Loose Change: 
Final Cut, which sets out to prove that the official explanation for the 9/11 attacks on the New 
York World Trade Center buildings is false.  After viewing the clip, participants were either 
given a fact-based argument against the film (e.g., that the film provided no evidence that 
explosives were used to demolish the World Trade Center buildings), or logic-based arguments 
(e.g., that the theory lacks parsimony).  There was also a control condition where participants 
read no information.  Participants were then asked to indicate their belief in the theory that the 
US government participated in a conspiracy to carry out the 9/11 attacks.  Results revealed that 
the fact-based argument was most effective in reducing conspiracy belief.  
Our research described earlier (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b, Study 2) provides further 
evidence of the effectiveness of fact-based arguments.  Specifically, exposure to anti-conspiracy 
arguments about vaccines reduced belief in conspiracy theories relative to a control condition.  
However, results also indicated that exposure to anti-conspiracy information did not improve 
intentions to vaccinate relative to the control condition.  Therefore, whilst it may be easy to 
influence belief in conspiracy theories by introducing factual arguments, this may not be effective 
in changing peopleÕs behaviours.  As Jolley and Douglas (2014b) argued, Òonce the very idea of a 
conspiracy has been mentioned and has taken root, even strong [anti-conspiracy] arguments may 
be unable to lead to behavioural actionÓ (p. 8). 
We therefore next reasoned that a way to strengthen the persuasiveness of anti-conspiracy 
arguments may be to present them before participants have been exposed to conspiracy theories 
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next (Jolley & Douglas, 2017).  If material presented first is relatively controversial, interesting, 
and familiar, this tends to produce a primacy effect (i.e., the first arguments presented have an 
advantage; e.g., Furnham, 1986; Rosnow, 1966; Rosnow & Robinson, 1967).  We therefore 
hypothesised that presenting anti-conspiracy arguments before people are exposed to conspiracy 
material may inoculate them (e.g., McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961; Pfau & van Bockern, 1994) 
from any potentially harmful consequences.  We tested this hypothesis in two studies.   
In each study, participants were given anti-conspiracy arguments concerning vaccination 
either before or after conspiracy arguments, or in the absence of each other.  For example, in 
Study 1 (N = 267 participants from the USA recruited from Mturk) there were five different 
conditions.  Participants were asked to read one of five combinations of arguments: (1) 
conspiracy arguments only, (2) anti-conspiracy arguments only, (3) arguments refuting anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories, followed by arguments in favour (anti-conspiracy/conspiracy), (4) 
arguments in favour of conspiracy theories, followed by arguments refuting them 
(conspiracy/anti-conspiracy), or (5) a control condition where participants were presented with no 
information.  The materials were taken from Jolley and Douglas (2014b, Study 2).  Participants 
were then asked to rate the extent to which they believed in a series of anti-vaccine conspiracy 
theories, and the extent to which they perceived vaccines to be dangerous (potential mediators).  
Then, participants were presented with a scenario depicting a fictitious child and were asked to 
imagine that they were faced with the decision to have this child vaccinated against a specific 
(made up) disease (see Jolley & Douglas, 2014b).  
Results revealed that intentions to vaccinate were lower in the conspiracy condition than 
in the anti-conspiracy and control conditions, replicating previous research (Jolley & Douglas, 
2014b).  Furthermore, vaccination intentions were increased when participants were presented 
                CONSPIRACY THEORIES   42 
with anti-conspiracy arguments prior to exposure to conspiracy theories, but not when presented 
with anti-conspiracy arguments after exposure to conspiracy theories.  As predicted, therefore, 
anti-conspiracy arguments presented prior to exposure to conspiracy theories improved 
vaccination intentions (see Table 8).  These findings support Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, 
Schwarz, and CookÕs (2012) observation that misinformation may be ÒstickyÓ (p. 107) and may 
become even more persuasive if people have not had a chance to prepare a defence against the 
incorrect information.  Results further revealed that this effect was mediated by anti-vaccine 
conspiracy beliefs and the perception that vaccines are dangerous.  We replicated these findings 
in a second study (N = 180 participants from the USA recruited via Prolific Academic). In this 
study, vaccination intentions were again improved when anti-conspiracy arguments were 
presented before conspiracy theories, but were not improved when anti-conspiracy arguments 
were presented after conspiracy theories.  
TABLE 8 HERE 
There is therefore a growing literature on the consequences of conspiracy theories and 
conspiracy theorising.  Further research is needed to illuminate the potentially negative 
consequences and also to uncover the positive outcomes of conspiracy theorising.  It also appears 
that a distinct challenge for scholars will be to determine whatÑif anythingÑcan or should be 
done about the influence of conspiracy theories. 
Limitations and future directions 
 Despite a massive growth in activity over the past decade, research on the social 
psychology of conspiracy theories is still very much in its infancy and the research to date 
therefore suffers from some important limitations that need to be addressed in future 
investigations.  In this final section of the article, we refer to the limitations of our own research 
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programme and research on the social psychology of conspiracy theories in general, whilst 
suggesting possible solutions and making suggestions for future research. 
 Firstly, with a few exceptions, our research has relied on correlational research designs.  
Most of the time, we have measured beliefs in conspiracy theories and have also measured other 
variables of interest that we theorise will predict conspiracy beliefs (e.g., education), via 
mediators which we have also measured via self-report scales (e.g., agency detection; see 
Douglas et al., 2016).  This limits the conclusions we are able to draw from this research.  
Specifically, whilst such research may suggest causal directional effects and mediation patterns, 
they cannot establish causality.  Also, in some cases, reverse causal patterns might be equally 
plausible and correlational designs cannot rule them out.  Future research should therefore focus 
more effort on experimental designs and longitudinal studies to establish cause and effect.  
 Another limitation of this research and other research in this area is that we have typically 
sampled from undergraduate student populations or samples from online crowdsourcing sites 
such as Crowdflower and Mturk.  Whilst the latter are more representative of society as a whole 
and we can therefore draw more accurate inferences about conspiracy beliefs amongst the general 
public, they are still not representative samples and are typically younger and more educated than 
representative samples.  Political scientists working on conspiracy beliefs tend to collect data 
from more representative samples, and it would be ideal if psychology could follow suit. 
 That said, many of the demographic variables that have been linked to beliefs in 
conspiracy theories (e.g., education, socioeconomic status; see Douglas, Sutton et al., 2017 for a 
review) would imply that representative general population samples are in many cases also not 
ideal.  Instead, to better understand the psychological processes that attract people to conspiracy 
theories, researchers should focus more on the groups of people in society who seem most drawn 
                CONSPIRACY THEORIES   44 
to them.  Ideally, too, psychologists should study the psychological processes underlying 
conspiracy beliefs for those who are strong believers.  In our studies of student and general public 
samples, overall belief in conspiracy theories tends to be quite low (e.g., around midpoint on a 5- 
or 7-point scale).  These are not the people for whom conspiracy theories are important to their 
everyday lives.  These are also not people for whom conspiracy theories strongly drive their daily 
decisions.  More research should therefore focus on people who score high on measures of 
conspiracy beliefs.  Potentially, too, different measures of conspiracy belief (e.g., interview 
responses, eye-tracking responses to conspiracy material, reaction times in responding to 
conspiracy material) could be valuable additions to the social psychologistÕs toolbox for 
examining conspiracy beliefs.  
 Another limitation of our research is that in our studies we have not always controlled for 
all variables that might plausibly be associated with conspiracy belief.  For example, we 
controlled for variables such as RWA and SDO in our studies of attachment style and conspiracy 
beliefs (Green & Douglas, 2018) but did not control for these in other studies of individual 
differences and conspiracy theories, instead controlling for demographics such as age and 
political ideology (e.g., Douglas et al., 2016).  Whilst it is not possible to include all potential 
correlates in every studyÑstudies would become impractically lengthy for participantsÑa more 
systematic approach to control variables is needed in future research.  In a similar vein, the 
mediators are not always consistent in our research.  Feelings of powerlessness tend to emerge as 
a consistent mediator of the relationship between conspiracy theories and social action (e.g., 
political, vaccination, environmental; see Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, b), but again a more 
systematic approach to studying mediation (and also potential moderating variables) would be 
fruitful for future research and would help focus the literature further.   
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 Next, our research on the consequences of conspiracy theories has solely focused on 
negative consequences (e.g., apathy, disengagement and inaction; see Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 
b; Douglas & Leite, 2017).  However, some theorists point to the potential benefits of conspiracy 
theories.  For example, Imhoff and Bruder (2014) found in one context that beliefs in conspiracy 
theories motivated rather than attenuated social action aimed at changing the status quo.  Others 
have suggested that conspiracy theories may inspire debate and make authorities accountable for 
their actions (Clarke, 2002; Miller, 2002).  Attempts to undermine conspiracy theories might also 
undermine some of these positive consequences.  More research therefore needs to examine when 
conspiracy theories might be helpful rather than harmful, and when efforts are made to debunk or 
undermine conspiracy theories, researchers need to be mindful of the positive as well as the 
negative consequences that might be affected.    
 Finally, whilst recent efforts have been made to organise the social psychological 
literature on conspiracy theories and to develop theoretical frameworks from which to study them 
(Douglas, Sutton et al., 2017), more theoretical work still needs to be done.  In particular, the 
research to dateÑincluding our own research which we have highlighted in this articleÑis 
largely focused on processes occurring at the level of the individual.  However, conspiracy 
theories are also important intergroup phenomena.  Indeed, as Moscovici (1987) argued, 
conspiracy theories are social representationsÑthat is shared beliefs about things that have 
happened and who the responsible actors are.  These typically have an Òus vs. themÓ flavour, 
focusing on fear and resentment of outgroups and in particular of minority groups.  Research and 
theorising could return to these early social psychological conceptualisations of conspiracy 
theories to better integrate individual and group-level factors.   
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Conclusions 
 In summary, research has established that conspiracy theories are widespread in the social 
environment, widely believed, and consequential.  They are not mere aberrations to be studied 
through the lens of abnormal or personality psychology but complex phenomena to be studied by 
scholars across the humanities and social sciences.  The findings we have reviewed in this article, 
including those from our own research programme, indicate that social psychology plays a vital 
role in understanding what causes conspiracy theories to be so commonplace and influential.    
 Conspiracy theories also provide opportunities for social psychologists to connect with 
other academic disciplines.  They are a phenomenon that everyone agrees exists.  Most 
disciplines use the same language to describe them.  The study of conspiracy theories is not like 
other topics where separate research literatures have emerged and similar phenomena are studied 
using different theoretical languages and different definitions.  Collaborations across disciplines 
are also developing.  In 2015, Peter Knight and Michael ButterÑtwo scholars from American 
studiesÑsuccessfully set up a European COST action on ÒComparative analysis of conspiracy 
theoriesÓ.  This project brings together senior and junior researchers studying conspiracy theories 
across many disciplines in the humanities and social sciences.  Research projects are emerging 
from this network and an interdisciplinary volume on conspiracy theories will be published in 
2020.  These networks are important.  They help scholars to bridge their theoretical and 
methodological divides to produce research that considers conspiracy theories from a variety of 
different anglesÑand this is essential for such a complex phenomenon.  Social psychology will 
be an important part of this process.   
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Agency detection significantly predicts belief in conspiracy theories (Douglas, Sutton, Callan, 
Dawtry & Harvey, 2016, Study 1, N = 202; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001).  
 
 
Predictor variable  β t 
Anthropomorphism  .249     3.65*** 
Perceived intentionality  .130 2.00* 
Age -.160 -2.27* 
Religiosity .078 1.10 
Political conservatism  .224    3.26** 
Education level  -.051 -.73 
Annual household income  .030 .40 
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Table 2 
Correlations between belief in conspiracy theories, pattern perception, and supernatural beliefs 
(van Prooijen, Douglas & de Inocencio, 2018, Study 1, N = 264; *** p < 0.001). 
 
 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Belief in existing conspiracy 
theories 
2.88 0.84 -    
2. Belief in fictitious conspiracy 
theories 
2.69 0.84 .70*** -    
3. Supernatural beliefs 2.46 0.69 .47*** .54*** -  
4. Pattern perception  2.82 1.51 .37*** .44*** .38*** - 
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Table 3 
Means (and standard deviations) for predictor variables in van der Wal et al. (in press), Study 1, 
N = 200, and beta-weights from a regression model in which conspiracy thinking was the 
criterion variable, *** p < .001  
 
                                     Means (SD) 
Predictor Mean Predicts conspiracy belief 
b 
Education (1-4) 2.80 (1.11) -.10 
Age 36.32 (11.38) -.05 
Gender (1=Male, 2 = Female) 1.48 (0.50) -.03 
Ease of explanation (1-9) 4.14 (1.44) -.05 
Correlation is coincidence (1-9) 6.22 (1.53) -.02 
Correlation produced by third cause (1-9) 4.05 (1.57) .07 
Direct causal connection 3.19 (1.43) .37*** 
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Table 4 
Exposure to conspiracy theories increases satisfaction with the status quo under system threat 
(Jolley, Douglas & Sutton, 2018, Study 2, N = 190). 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                                     Means (SD) 
Condition Affirm    Threat 
Conspiracy 4.68 (.56), n = 38 4.95 (.60), n = 39 
No conspiracy 4.81 (.71), n = 43 4.48 (.80), n = 40 
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Table 5 
Predictors of conspiracy beliefs (Green & Douglas, 2018, Study 1, N = 246;   p < 0.10, * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01). 
 
 
Variable  t    β 
Anxious   2.03   0.16* 
Avoidant - 1.21 - 0.10 
RWA   0.19   0.02 
SDO   1.99   0.13* 
Manichean   3.63   0.23** 
Trust - 3.56 - 0.24** 
Age - 0.58 - 0.04 
Education - 1.79 - 0.11  
Religiosity    1.22   0.08  
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Table 6 
Mean (and standard deviation) control, retrospective and current attitudes towards for self and 
other.  Higher values indicate greater rated endorsement of the statements (Douglas & Sutton,  




                 Attitude rating 
            Control      Retrospective   Current   Perceived   Actual  
         attitude change          attitude change 
              
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Self 1.75 (0.62)aa 2.53 (1.05)b  2.68 (1.06)dd    0.15 (0.40)f  
Person                                               0.93 (1.21 )g 
Other 2.15 (0.75)c 2.42 (0.84)bc  3.13 (1.01)ee    0.71 (0.98)g 
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Table 7 
Multiple mediation test of the relationship between anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs (IV; a) and 
vaccination intentions (DV; c) through perceived dangers of vaccines (a), and feelings of 
powerlessness (b), disillusionment (c) and trust in authorities (d) (MVs; b) with 5000 bootstrap 
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aa 1.17 (.11)***  c -.63 (.16)*** c’ -.02 (.26) 
ab .97 (.15)***      
ac 1.06 (.12)***      
ad -.65 (.14)***      
‘MV’     ba -.46 (.16)*** 
     bb  .04 (.12) 
     bc  -.14 (.14) 
     bd  .08 (.13) 
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Table 8 
Means and standard deviations across conditions for conspiracy belief, perceptions that vaccines 
are dangerous, and intentions to vaccinate (Jolley & Douglas, 2017; Study 1, N = 260, Ns for 
each condition respectively = 55, 52, 52, 50, and 51).  
 
 







Conspiracy 4.47 (0.81) 4.50 (1.26) 4.42 (1.76) 
Anti-conspiracy 3.38 (1.02) 2.92 (1.57) 5.60 (1.49) 
Control 3.83 (1.12) 3.55 (1.62) 5.50 (1.21) 
Anti-conspiracy/Conspiracy 3.94 (1.00) 3.63 (1.56) 5.04 (1.69) 
Conspiracy/Anti-conspiracy 4.23 (0.91) 4.04 (1.45) 4.80 (1.77) 




Belief in a cover-up explains belief in mutually incompatible conspiracy theories (Wood, 
Douglas & Sutton, 2012, Study 2, N = 102; coefficients are beta coefficients; * p < .05;  














Osama bin Laden is 
still alive 
Osama bin Laden was 
already dead 
Osama bin Laden is 
still alive 
Osama bin Laden was 
already dead 
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Figure 2 
The link between personal morality and belief in conspiracy theories is mediated by personal 
willingness to conspire (Douglas & Sutton, 2011, Study 2, N = 60; 30 per condition; coefficients 





 Morality Belief in conspiracy 
theories 
Personal willingness 
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Figure 3 
Mediation model of the relationship between exposure to conspiracy theories and satisfaction 
with the status quo through attributions for social problems.  (Jolley, Douglas & Sutton, 2018, 
Study 3, N = 166). Results based on 5000 bootstrapped resamples.  The overall indirect effect 
was significant, (LLCI = -.5667, ULCI = -.0621; Adj R2 = .10, F(2,51) = 13.97, p < .001; * p < 







Conspiracy theories               
(1 = conspiracy, 0 = 
control) 
Satisfaction with the status 
quo 
Attributions to 
individuals and small 
groups (vs. systemic 
causes) 
.50 (.20)** 0.60 (.09)*** 
 -.86 (.23)*** 
(-.56 [.20]**) 
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Figure 4 
Multiple mediation test of the relationship between information type (conspiracy versus 
mainstream) and intended political behaviours (Jolley & Douglas, (2014a, Study 1 N = 168; 
dashed lines highlight non-significant relationships and solid lines highlight significant 





















‘a’ paths = independent variable to mediator 
‘b’ paths = mediators to DV controlling for IV 
‘c’ path = IV to DV without the mediators – a.k.a. total effect 
‘c’’ path = IV to DV controlling for the mediators – a.k.a. the direct effect 
c 
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Figure 5 
Unstandardised coefficients for mediation analyses using the PROCESS macro (Model 4, 10,000 
bootstraps; Hayes, 2013), controlling for belief in other conspiracy theories (Douglas & Leite, 




















b = -0.48, SE = .11*** b = 0.81, SE = .08 
Organisational 
Commitment b = -0.50, SE = .08*** b = -0.33, SE = .11** 
